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Indiana Choice-of-Law Doctrine
After Gollnick v. Gollnick
PETERT. SNOW
INTRODUCTION

Indiana choice-of-law doctrine for torts has become increasingly complex as it has
progressed from the traditional rule oflex loci delicti to the two-step rule announced
by the Indiana Supreme Court in HubbardManufacturing Co. v. Greeson.' In
Hubbard,the supreme court declined to adopt the "most significant relationship" test
of the Restatement(Second)ofConflict ofLaws3 ("SecondRestatement") and instead
created a hybrid rule that represents a compromise between lex loci delicti and the
Second Restatement approach.4 Presumably, the supreme court wanted to retain the

advantages of lex loci delicti-such as its "certainty, predictability, uniformity, and
discouragement of forum shopping" 5--while avoiding its sometimes "anomalous
result[s]."" Unfortunately, the supreme court did not draw a particularly bright line
in Hubbard.As a result, lower courts7 and commentators8 have struggled to discern

* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1998,
Rhodes College. I thank my father, Judge P. Thomas Snow of Wayne County Superior Court
I in Richmond, Indiana, for directing me to this topic and sharing with me his experience and
insight while I drafted this Note.
1. Under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, the law of the state where the last event necessary
to make the defendant liable took place governs all substantive issues in the case. See BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIoNARY 911 (6th ed. 1990).
2. 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind.1987).
3. RESTATEMENT(SEcoND)oFCONFUCTSOFLAWS § 145(1) (1971) [hereinafter SECOND
RESTATEMENT]. Under the Second Restatement test, the court considers a variety of factors
bearing on the plaintiff's relationship to multiple states to determine the law that will govern
each individualissue in the case. See id. (emphasis added).
4. See Hubbard,515 N.E.2d at 1073; see also Geri J. Yonover, The Golden Anniversary
of the Choice ofLaw Revolution: IndianaFiredthe FirstShot, 29 IND. L. REV. 1201, 1207
(1996) ("In Hubbard... the Indiana Supreme Court finally abandoned a strict lex loci
approach to choice of law for tort cases.").
5. Yonover, supra note 4, at 1207 ("Perhaps the perceived advantages of the First
Restatement approach... gave lex loci its longevity in Indiana and elsewhere.... .').
6. Hubbard,515 N.E.2d at 1073 ("Rigid application of [lex loci delicti] to this case,
however, would lead to an anomalous result. Had plaintiff... filed suit in any bordering state
the only forum which would not have applied the substantive law of Indiana is Indiana.").
7. See, e.g., Castelli v. Steele, 700 F. Supp. 449,454 n.5 (S.D. Ind. 1988) ("Although the
Hubbarddecision is well-reasoned, it does not provide a definitive standard for determining
whether a state in which the injury occurred bears 'little connection' to the cause of action..
..
');Thomas v. Whiteford Nat'l Lease, 580 N.E.2d 717, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) ("[Ihe First
District found that Illinois rather than Indiana tort law applied to a negligence action...
between Indiana residents in Illinois.... However, the Tompkins court erroneously stated that
the last event necessary to make the defendant liable in Hubbardtook place in Indiana."
(citations omitted)); Gollnick v. Gollnick ex rel. Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1988) (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting) ("I do not agree with the majority's interpretation of the
effect to be given HubbardManufacturingCo., Inc. v. Greeson.... The second step of the
Greeson test.., is not applicable in this case." (citation omitted)), affd and adopted per
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both when to consider certain factors and how much weight to assign them under the
new rule.
Shortly after Hubbard,the supreme court granted transfer of Gollnick v. Goilnick
ex rel Gollnick? In Gollnick, the First District Court of Appeals of Indiana applied
the choice-of-law rule from Hubbard to decide whether California or Indiana
intrafamily-inmmunity doctrine should govern a California father's liability for his
daughter's injury from a sledding accident in Indiana."° As Part I of this Note will
discuss, the court of appeals in Gollnick interpreted the Hubbardrule in a manner
inconsistent with the precedent set by the supreme court in Hubbard.On transfer,
however, the supreme court did not address this inconsistency, but instead affirmed
and adopted the court of appeals's opinion as its own." As a result, opposing counsel
may argue two conflicting interpretations of the Hubbardrule before a trial court
because both claim the official sanction of the Indiana Supreme Court. 2
Ultimately, the supreme court's adoption of Gollnick must stand for one of two
propositions: (1) the Hubbardrule allows the consideration of a broad range of
factors at the outset of every choice-of-law determination and so operates closer to
the Second Restatement model, or (2) the Hubbard rule focuses initially on the
independent significance of the place where the injury occurred, except in the
resolution of family disputes, where strong policy concerns justify applying the law
of the parties' domicile.
This Note argues that the latter proposition is a more accurate and workable
understanding ofIndiana choice-of-law doctrine. Part I analyzes the Indiana Supreme
Court's decision in Hubbardand explains how the Hubbardrule should operate in
practice. Part II discusses how the supreme court's adoption of Gollnick spurred an
exception to the Hubbardrule. Part III addresses how the family-law origin of the
Gollnick exception shapes its nature and scope.
To highlight its scope, Part IV considers whether the Hubbardrule governs the
applicability of a guest statute or whether the Gollnick exception should apply. The

curiam by 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989).
8. See Yonover, supra note 4, at 1210 ("An examination of Indiana choice of law cases
since Hubbardleaves the reader with a feeling of unease. Most cases do not explain fully why
the place of tort does or does not bear a significant connection to the case." (emphasis in
original)).
9. 517 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), affd and adoptedpercuriam by 539 N.E.2d
3 (Ind. 1989). Gollnick has an interesting procedural history. The court of appeals decided
Gollnick for the first time prior to the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Hubbard and
applied lex loci delicti. See Gollnick v. Gollnick ex rel. Gollnick, 514 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987), on reh 'g,517 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), affd and adoptedpercuriam
by 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989). After Hubbard,the first district granted a petition for rehearing
and decided the choice-of-law issue underthe new rule. See Gollnick,517 N.E.2d at 1257. For
the purpose of this Note, I will use the case name Gollnickto refer only to the opinion rendered
by the first district court of appeals on rehearing, unless otherwise noted.
10. See Gollnick, 514 N.E.2d at 647 (reciting facts); Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d at 1258-59
(applying Hubbardanalysis).
11. See Gollnick v. Gollnick, 539 N.E.2d 3, 4 (Ind. 1989).
12. See, e.g., Baca v. New Prime, Inc., No. 89D01-9804-CT-014 (Ind. Wayne County
Super. Ct. I Oct. 11, 2000) (unpublished state trial court case on file with the Indiana Law
Journat).
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sharp contrast between the familial nature of many guest statutes-a shared familial
relationship is often a required element for their application-and the purposes
offered for their enactment--such as the prevention ofinsurance fraud-makes guest
statutes an excellent starting point from which to consider the Gollnick exception's
scope. Concluding that the Gollnick exception does not apply to guest statutes, Part
IV's comparison of the unique history of Indiana's guest statute with the policy
concerns behind the Gollnick exception also provides a nice example of how courts
might consider the exception's scope in other contexts as well.

I. THE HUBBA D RULE
Before the supreme court's decision in Hubbard,Indiana adhered to the choice-oflaw doctrine of lex loci delicti commissi, more commonly known as lex loci delicti
or lex delicti.' 3 "The 'lex loci delicti,' or 'place of the wrong,' is the state where the
last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged fort takes place."' 4 Once
a court determines which state is the lex loci delicti, that state's law will govern all
substantive issues in the case." Some of the benefits of the doctrine are that it is
simple to apply and highly predictable. 6 As a result, litigants spend less time debating
the applicability of the law and more time arguing the merits of the case." However,
lex loci delicti may also lead to potentially unfair outcomes by subjecting claimants
to the law of a state with which they have only a tenuous relationship at best.'" Wary
of such results, the supreme court abrogated lex loci delicti and crafted a more
complex choice-of-law rule in Hubbard.
A. The IndianaSupreme CourtDecision
In Hubbard,the plaintiff's husband died from injuries sustained while he was
working in Illinois on a lift unit manufactured in Indiana. 9 Plaintiff filed a wrongful
death action against the manufacturer and premised both of her theories of liability
on the manufacture of the lift unit.2" Under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, the choiceof-law rule for torts at the time, the supreme court noted that the law of Illinois would
govern all substantive issues because the injuries that led to decedent's death had

13. See Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ind. 1987); see also
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 911 (6th ed. 1990).
14. BLACK'sLAwDICTIoNARY911 (6thed. 1990) (citing Sestito v. Knop, 297 F.2d 33, 34
(7th Cir. 1961)).
15. See Gollnick, 514 N.E.2d at 645.
16. See Yonover, supra note 4, at 1207 (stating one of the advantages of the lex loci delicti
doctrine is its predictability).
17. See id. (providing discouragement of forum shopping as an advantage of the lex loci
delicti approach).
18. See id. at 1201-07 ("Noting that all states bordering Indiana would not apply Illinois
law as the place of injury, the [Hubbard]court found it 'anomalous' and 'inappropriate' that
Indiana would do so.").
19. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (Ind. 1987).
20. Id.
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occurred in Illinois." However, the supreme court also noted that all of the states
bordering Indiana, none of which follow lex loci delicti, would have applied Indiana
substantive law if given the same facts.' Displeased with this "anomalous result,"'
the supreme court departed from the strict application of lex loci delicti in torts cases
and devised a new choice-of-law rule. Chief Justice Shepard stated for the court:
In a large number of cases, the place of the tort will be significant and the
place with the most contacts.... In such cases, the traditional rule serves well.
A court should be allowed to evaluate other factors when the place of the tort is
an insignificant contact. In those instances where the place of the tort bears little
connection to the legal action, this Court will permit the consideration of other
factors .... 24

From this statement of the rule, two propositions are immediately clear: (1) in some
instances, the "traditional rule" of lex loci delicti will apply and (2) in other instances,
lex loci delicti will not apply.
Most courts have reduced the rule set out by the supreme court in Hubbardto two
steps," even though there are actually three inquiries to be made. As a preliminary
matter, courts must determine the "place of the tort" with respect to the plaintiff's
cause of action before engaging the "first step" of the Hubbardrule." In Hubbard,
the supreme court held that Illinois was the place of the tort, because it was where the
"last event necessary" to make the defendant liable occurred." Put simply, the death
of plaintiffs husband in Illinois was the last event that had to occur before her
wrongful death action could proceed. In practice, the place of the tort will always be
where the plaintiffs injuries occur or where damages accrue, because a plaintiff
cannot have a claim without an injury or damages even if someone is negligent?
After identifying the place of the tort, the first recognized step of the Hubbardrule
is to determine whether that place is a significant contact. 9 Applying the language in
Hubbard,courts determine significance by asking whether the place of the tort "bears

21. Id. at 1073-74.
22. Id.
23. 7d.; see also Castelli v. Steele, 700 F. Supp. 449, 452 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (explaining that
the "anomalous results" that the Indiana Supreme Court sought to avoid in Hubbardoccur
"[w]hen the injury and the tortuous conduct do not coincide").
24. Hubbard,515 N.E.2d at 1073 (citations omitted).
25. In Castelli, Judge McKinney stated, "[F]or simplicity sake... this Court will refer to
Hubbardas requiring athree pronged analysis, for as the Hubbardand Gollnickopinions make
clear, there are three separate inquiries." Castelli, 700 F. Supp. at 452 n.2. However, most
courts have referred to and applied the Hubbard rule in two steps. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Whiteford Nat'l Lease, 580 N.E.2d 717, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (referring to the "two-step
choice-of-law rule" adopted in Hubbard); Bencor Corp. v. Harris, 534 N.E.2d 271,272 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1989).
26. Hubbard,515 N.E.2d at 1073-74.
27. Id. at 1074.
28. See Castelli, 700 F. Supp. at 453 (citing EUGENE F. SCOLES &PETER HAY, CoNFUCT
OF LAWS § 17.2, at 552 (Lawyer's ed. 1984)).
29. Hubbard,515 N.E.2d at 1074.
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little connection to the legal action."3 When applying this step in Hubbard,the
supreme court focused exclusively on the contacts that tied Illinois (the place where
plaintiff's husband died) to plaintiff's action for wrongful death.31 More specifically,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's defective manufacture ofa lift unit in Indiana
caused her husband's death in Illinois.32
The supreme court noted several contacts with Illinois that did not factor into its
determination because they were irrelevant to the cause of action. 33 Among the
irrelevant contacts, the court listed (1) the decedent's employment in Illinois at the
time of his death, (2) the involvement of an Illinois vehicle in the accident (3) the
coroner's inquest in Illinois, and (4) the receipt of worker's compensation benefits
in Illinois by the family of decedent.' The court refused to give the above contacts
any weight in its analysis under the first step because "[n]one of these facts relate[d]
to the wrongful death action filed against Hubbard: 35'
Without these contacts to bolster the plaintiff's relationship to Illinois, the supreme
court held that the place of the tort was insignificant.36 Therefore, lex loci delicti did
not apply, and the court was free to consider other factors under the second step.3 '
Under the second step of the Hubbardrule, courts may consider "other factors" in
making their choice-of-law determination.3 The supreme court suggested that courts
consider "(1) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (2) the
residence or place of business ofthe parties; and (3) the place where the relationship
'
At least one court of appeals has suggested that courts are not limited
is centered."39
to examination of only those contacts suggested by the supreme court under the
second step. Moreover, courts must balance all contacts "according to their relative
importance to the particular issues being litigated."'
The supreme court did not provide a mechanism to determine how much weight to
give individual contacts under the second step.42 In Hubbard, the supreme court
stated that "Indiana has the more significant relationship and contacts"43 and then
named the factors that supported the application of Indiana law. The supreme court
stated:

30. Id. at 1073.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 1071.
33. Id. at 1074.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
at 1073 ("A court should be allowed to evaluate other factors when the place
37. See id.
of the tort is an insignificant contact.").
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1073-74.
40. See In re Estate of Bruck, 632 N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) ("[V e are not
confined to the three factors specifically suggested in Hubbard.").
41. Hubbard,515 N.E.2d at 1074.
42. Id.; see also Yonover, supra note 4, at 1210 ("[Indiana] courts seem to be contactcounting, without furnishing an adequate method to determine the weight or priority of certain
contacts compared to other contacts.').
43. Hubbard,515 N.E.2d at 1074.
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The plaintiff's two theories of recovery relate to the manufacture of the lift in
Indiana. Both parties are from Indiana; plaintiff Elizabeth Greeson is a resident
of Indiana and defendant Hubbard is an Indiana corporation with its principal
place ofbusiness in Indiana. The relationship between the deceased and Hubbard
centered in Indiana. The deceased frequently visited defendant's plant in Indiana
to discuss the repair and maintenance of the lift."
B. Analysis of the Rule and Its Effects
By hinging the application of lex loci delicti on the discrete relationship between

the place of the tort and the legal action, the supreme court maintained a balance
between lex loci delicti and the more liberal approach of the second step. The
supreme court retained some advantages of the old rule-litigants can more easily
predict whether lex loci delicti will apply knowing that it depends on how a clearly
defined set of facts relates to a distinct legal issue. After a determination that the
place of the tort is insignificant-that lex loci delicti does not apply-courts are
provided more flexibility under the second step.4"
The sharp contrast between the focus of the first and second steps of the Hubbard
rule makes it clear that the supreme court did not intend to adopt the Second
Restatement's most-significant-relationship test in its entirety.' Under the Second
Restatement test, a plurality of factors is taken into account from the outset to
determine which forum has the "most significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties" involved.47 In contrast, the Hubbardrule dictates that the court first
consider only the facts bearing on the relationship between the place of the tort and
the specific legal action before considering the broad range of factors suggested by
4
the Second Restatement.

Naturally, the outcome under the first step is determined by only a fraction of the
total contacts a suit may have with a variety ofjurisdictions. If that subset of contacts
bears more than a "little connection" to the legal action, then the place of the tort is
significant and lex loci delicti applies.49 Conversely, lex loci delicti does not apply
when the only contacts between the place of the tort and the suit are of little or no
relevance to the legal action.50 A suit with dozens of contacts to the place of the tort

44. Id.
45. See id. at 1073-74.
46. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 145(1).

47. Id.

48. Hubbard,515 N.E.2d at 1073-74.
49. See Bencor Corp. v. Harris, 534 N.E.2d 271,273 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). Inaffirming the
trial court's application of lex loci delicti, the court of appeals stated: "IT]he performance of
the construction contract, the direction of the workman, the instrumentality that caused injury,
the alleged negligence, and the injury all occurred in Indiana .... All of the acts relative to the
commission of the tort occurred in Indiana." Id.
50. Castelli v. Steele, 700 F. Supp. 449,454 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
Under the facts of this case, it is clear that the state of Illinois bears "little
connection" to the cause of action. The only contacts with Illinois are that the
injury accrued there, the plaintiff resides there, and that a phone call to Dr. Steele
originated from there .... However, just as in Hubbard,these facts have little
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theoretically will not trigger the application oflex loci delicti ifnone of those contacts
are relevant to the legal action. (In that case, however, it would be strange if the law
of the place of the tort ultimately did not apply after analysis under the second step
of the Hubbardrule.) In short, lex loci delicti presumptively applies in tort cases
unless the place of the tort is legally insignificant.5
The narrow focus of the first step is an important element of the Hubbardrule that
appellate courts have applied inconsistently.' In Tompkins v. Isbell,53 two Indiana
residents were in an automobile accident in Illinois.' The First District Court of
Appeals of Indiana focused on the relationship between Illinois and the alleged
negligent operation of a tractor, the basis of plaintiffs' legal action. The first district
held that Illinois had "extensive connection" to the legal action because Illinois's
rules of the road governed the defendant's operation of the tractor while in Illinois.55
When explaining its holding, however, the first district incorrectly stated that the last
event necessary to make the defendant liable in Hubbardoccurred in Indiana.5'
In Thomas v. WhitefordNationalLease,' the Third District Court of Appeals of
Indiana cited this flaw in the Tompkins opinion and held that Indiana law applied to
an automobile accident in Michigan between Indiana residents."8 The third district's
holding in Thomas was in direct conflict with the first district's holding in Tompkins.
In Tompkins, the site of an automobile accident was significant enough to trigger lex
loci delicti.59 In Thomas, it was not.' Although the first district was not accurate
when it said that the "last event necessary to make the defendant [in Hubbard]liable"
occurred in Indiana,6 its choice-of-law analysis followed the supreme court's
analysis in Hubbardmore closely than did the third district's analysis in Thomas.
In Thomas, the third district stated that "[i]f the place of the tort has extensive

relationship to this medical malpractice action.
Id.; see also KPMG Peat Marwick v. Asher, 689 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind.Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that the place of the tort bore little connection to an accounting negligence action,
even though it was both where the plaintiffs' injury occurred and where the plaintiffs, almost
600 farmers, worked).
51. In re Estate of Bruck, 632 N.E.2d 745, 747 (Ind.Ct. App. 1994) ('[L]ex loci delicti is
the rule presumptively to be applied unless the place of the tort is an insignificant contact, in
which case other factors may be considered.").
52. See, e.g., Thomas v. WhitefordNat'l Lease, 580 N.E.2d 717, 718 (Ind.Ct. App. 1991)
(applying the first step of the Hubbard rule with a broad focus); Tompkins v. Isbell, 543
N.E.2d 680, 681-82 (Ind.Ct. App. 1989) (applying the first step with an appropriately narrow
focus).
53. 543 N.E.2d 680 (Ind. Ct.App. 1989).
54. Id. at 681.
55. Id. at 682.
56. Id. at 681. On the contrary, the supreme court's decision to adopt a new choice-of-law
rule in Hubbard stemmed from the fact that the last event necessary to make the defendant
liable occurred in Illinois. See Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (Ind.
1987).
57. 580 N.E.2d 717 (Ind.Ct. App. 1991).
58. Id. at 718.
59. Tompkins, 543 N.E.2d at 681-82.
60. Thomas, 580 N.E.2d at 718.
61. Tompkins, 543 N.E.2d at 681.
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connection with the legal action, the traditional rule of lex loci delicti... applies."62
However, in Hubbardthe supreme court did not say that the place of the tort must
have "extensive connection" with the legal action. The supreme court said only that
the place of the tort must be significant for lex loci delicti to apply.63
The third district's misstatement of the Hubbardrule is telling, yet understandable.
In Hubbard,the supreme court stated: "[]n a large number of cases, the place of the
tort will be significant and the place with the most contacts. In such cases, the
traditional rule serves well."" By saying "[i]n such cases, the traditional rule serves
well," the supreme court did not limit the application of lex loci delicti to only those
cases in which both the "significance" and "most contacts" criteria are met. Rather,
the supreme court made a statement as to the particular propriety of lex loci delicti in
cases where the place of the tort is both significant and has the most contacts. The
supreme court then diminished the reach of lex loci delicti by suspending its
presumptive application in cases where the significance factor is not satisfied.' By
"significance," the supreme court refers solely to the relationship between the place
of the tort and the legal action. As discussed, this understanding of "significance" is
supported by the supreme court's own application of the rule in Hubbard.'
In Thomas, the third district misapplied the Hubbardrulebyprematurelyweighing
the factors of the second step against the connection between the place of the tort and
the legal action." The additional contacts considered by the third district-the
residences of the parties, their place of employment, and the place where they
received workers' compensation benefits--may onlybe considered where the court
has determined that the place of the tort bears little connection to the legal action. 0
If the third district had applied the Hubbardrule properly, it would have found that
the place of the tort was significant because the conduct of the defendant in Michigan
determined his liability."' That determination would have foreclosed the court's
consideration of any additional factors and lex loci delicti would have applied. 2

62. Thomas, 580 N.E.2d at 718 (emphasis added).
63. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind. 1987).
64. Id. (citation omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
68. Thomas v. Whiteford Nat'l Lease, 580 N.E.2d 717, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
69. Id.
70. See Hubbard,515 N.E.2d at 1073.
71. See Thomas, 580 N.E.2d at 718.
72. See Cox v. Nichols, 690 N.E.2d 750,752 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). In Cox, two Michigan
residents sued their uninsured motorist carrier and an uninsured Indiana driver for damages
arising out of a car accident in Indiana. Id. at 751. The court of appeals held that Indiana law
applied after finding that the collision in Indiana was significant with respect to the plaintiffs'
action. Id. at 752. The court noted that the case had several contacts with Michigan-both
plaintiffs resided there and their relationship with their insurance carrier was centered
there-but recognized that the accident itself was "not insignificant" and that defendant was
also an Indiana resident. Id. The significance ofthe place ofthe tort to the legal action triggered
the application of lex loci delicti and so the court did not weigh the Michigan contacts against
the Indiana contacts in the suit. Id.; see also Bencor Corp. v. Harris, 534 N.E.2d 271,273 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1989). In Bencor, the court of appeals applied Indiana law under the first step of the
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When courts, like the third district in Thomas, fail to restrict their focus under the
Hubbardrule, they invite a troubling degree of uncertainty and litigiousness to every
case involving a choice-of-law dispute. These courts not only must entertain the flood
of irrelevant contacts that will be presented by the parties to the suit, but they also
must take into account the supreme court's direction to balance those contacts
"according to their relative importance to the particular issues being litigated."73
Consequently, these courts may find themselves parceling a suit into several distinct
legal issues, reweighing the parties' contacts with respect to each of those issues, and
then determining the applicable law as to each one. In a single suit, a court may apply
Kentucky law on the issue of intrafamily immunity because the parties are family
members from Kentucky, Indiana law as to standard of liability because the tort
occurred in Indiana, and Ohio law as to the defendant's right of indemnification
against her employer because that is where their employment relationship and most
of the defendant's work-related activities were centered. The mere thought of
introducing such unbridled complexity into the courtroom is enough to make some
trial judges cringe.
III. GOLLNICK: THE EXCEPTION OR RULE?
The appellate decisions that misinterpret the Hubbardrule would be easier to
dismiss if the supreme court never adopted Gollnick.71 The First District Court of
Appeals ofIndianaheard the case two times before the supreme court finally adopted
and affirmed its opinion.75 When the first district originally heard the case, 6 the
supreme court had not decided Hubbard" and so the doctrine of lex loci delicti still
governed choice-of-law questions in tort cases. After Hubbard, the first district
agreed to rehear the original Gollnick to resolve the choice-of-law dispute under the
new rule. 8
The facts of Gollnick are as follows. Gregory and Verna Gollnick, California
residents, shared joint legal custody of their two daughters." In exercise of his
visitation rights, Gregory took his daughters to visit their aunt and uncle in Indiana.10
While in Indiana, one of the daughters, Karen, was injured when she sledded out of
her aunt and uncle's driveway and into the street"' Karen and her mother, Vema,

Hubbard rule. Id. at 272-73. The court recognized that "[a]ll of the acts relative to the
commission of the tort occurred in Indiana" while "[n]one of the Tennessee contacts affected
this legal action." Id.
73. Hubbard,515 N.E.2d at 1074.
74. Gollnick v. Golnick, 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989).
75. Gollnick v. Gollnick ex rel. Gollnick, 514 N.E.2d 645, 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), on
reh 'g, 517 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd and adoptedpercuriam by 539 N.E.2d 3
(Ind. 1989).
76. Id. (decided October 1987).
77. Hubbard,515 N.E.2d at 1071 (decided December 1987).
78. Gollnick v. Golnick ex rel. Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d 1257, 1258 (Ind.Ct. App. 1988),
a.rd and adoptedpercuriam by 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989).
79. Gollnick, 514 N.E.2d at 647.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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subsequently filed a complaint against both Karen's father and her aunt and uncle.8
The complaint alleged that Karen's father had negligently supervised Karen and that
her aunt and uncle had failed to warn Karen of a known danger. 3 All three
defendants moved for summary judgment"u The father's motion requested the
application of Indiana law and immunity from suit under Indiana's parental-immunity
doctrine. 5
When first before the court of appeals, Karen's father argued for the application
of Indiana law under the doctrine of lex loci delicti even though all parties were
domiciled in California." The court of appeals acknowledged that there was an
argument that California law should be applied, because the issue presented is not a
tort question, but immunity based upon a familial relationship, and California has an
exclusive interest in governing their family relationship.' Moreover, the application
of California law would provide continuity in the "rights and duties attendant to the
family relationship.""8 However, the court of appeals also recognized that lex loci
delicti governed Karen's claim because it was an action in tort. 9 The court held that,
under lex loci delicti, Indiana law applied to all substantive issues in the case,
including the issue of intrafamily immunity, because Karen's injuries occurred in
Indiana.'
On rehearing, the court of appeals applied the Hubbardrule to the same set of facts
and held that California, not Indiana, law applied.9 The court of appeals first asked
"whether the site of Karen's injury is a significant contact warranting the application
of Indiana substantive law."' In answering this question, however, the court of
appeals gave little attention to Karen's cause of action for negligent supervision,
Indiana, or the relationship between the two. Instead, the court discussed several
cases generally holding that intrafamily immunity is a family-law issue to be decided
by the law of the parties' domicile.93 None of the cases cited by the court of appeals
were Indiana cases.94 Presumably, the court of appeals reasoned that the place of the
tort was insignificant after its review of these cases, because it moved on to the
consideration of other factors under the second step.95 The court of appeals then

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 647-48.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 648.
89. See id. at 648-49.
90. See id.
91. See Gollnick v. Gollnick ex rel. Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind Ct. App. 1987), affd
and adoptedpercuriam by 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989).
92. Id. at 1258.
93. See id. at 1258-59 (citing Armstrong v. Armstrong,441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968), Emery
v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955), Wartell v. Formusa, 213 N.E.2d 544 (II1.1966), Aurora
Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 268 N.E.2d 552 (i1. App. Ct. 1971), and Wessling v. Paris, 417
S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967)).
94. Id. (relying on cases from Alaska, California, Illinois, and Kentucky).
95. See id. at 1259.
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noted that California's interest in the parties' family relationship was predominant
with respect to the issue of intrafamily immunity and held that California law
applied.'
When the state supreme court considered Gollnick,it did little more than affirm and
adopt the court of appeals's opinion on rehearing.97 The supreme court did offer a
brief, yet perplexing comment on the court of appeals's opinion. It said that "the
court of appeals did not alter Indiana law on parental immunity; it merely applied
California law to the claim against Gregory E. Gollnick in accordance with the
choice-of-law rule announced in Hubbard."8 However, the court of appeals's
reasoning in Gollnickis inconsistent with most Indiana courts' understanding of the
Hubbardrule. 9 In fact, courts generally do not cite Gollnick when they apply the
Hubbardrule."° With this in mind, it is more reasonable to consider Gollnick as an
exception to the general rule, rather than an example of its application.
In Gollnick, on rehearing, the court of appeals departed from a strict application of
the Hubbardrule by prematurely weighing the parties' contacts with regard to the
issue of intrafamily immunity instead of focusing on the relationship between the
place of the tort and the legal action.'" The court of appeals broadened its initial
focus to include the issue of intrafamily immunity for policy reasons, namely to
foster consistency in the duties owed between family members as they travel from
state to state.' 02 The court of appeals also reasoned that the state of the parties'

96. Id.
97. See Gollnick v. Gollnick, 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind.1989).
98. Id.
at 4.
99. See supra Part I.
100. See, e.g., Cox ex rel. Zick v. Nichols, 690 N.E.2d 750, 752 (Ind.Ct. App. 1998) (citing
Hubbard Mfg.Co.v. Greeson,515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987), and In re Estate of Bruck, 632
N.E.2d 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)); KPMG Peat Marwickv. Asher, 689 N.E.2d 1283, 1286-88
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind.1987),
Castelli v. Steele, 700 F. Supp. 449 (S.D. Ind. 1988), and Travelers Ins. Cos. v. Rogers, 579
N.E.2d 1328 (End. CL App. 1991)); In re Estate of Bruck, 632 N.E.2d 745, 747-49 (Ind. Ct..
App. 1994) (citing Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987), and Thomas
v. Whiteford Nat'l Lease, 580 N.E.2d 717 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)); Thomas v. Whiteford Nat'l
Lease, 580 N.E.2d 717, 717-18 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991) (citing Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515
N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987), and Tompkins v. Isbell, 543 N.E.2d 680 (Ind. Ct App. 1989));
Tompkins v. Isbell, 543 N.E.2d 680, 680-82 (Ind.Ct. App. 1989) (citing Hubbard Mfg. Co.
v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987), and Bencor Corp. v. Harris, 534 N.E.2d 271 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1989)).
101. The American Law Institute supports this understanding:
This court [of appeals in Gollnick] affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding,
inter alia, that although Indiana substantive law would usually be applied because
the site of the injury bore a significant relationship to the action, with regard to
the issue of intrafamily immunity, the law of the state of the parties' domicile
applied because Califomiahad apredominant interest in the family's relationship
that outweighed any interest this state had.
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supranote 3, § 169 app. at 306-07 (Supp. 1995).
102. See Gollnickv. Gollnickexrel.Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d 1257, 1258 (Ind.Ct. App. 1987),
aff'd and adoptedpercuriam by 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989) ("To hold otherwise,. . . would
subject the rights and duties attendant to the family relationship to constant change as family
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common domicile had a greater interest in the maintenance of the family
relationship."°3 From this perspective, it is clear that the court of appeals's concern
about these issues guided its decision much more than the Hubbardrule.
The family-law issues in Gollnick, however, were substantial. Karen and her

mother, Vema Gollnick, brought their action against Karen's father Gregory
(Vema's former spouse) as well as Karen's aunt and uncle, John and Margaret
Gollnick. '°Karen was injured in a sledding accident outside of her aunt and uncle's
home in Indiana while spending time with her father pursuant to his visitation rights
under a divorce agreement.' Karen, her mother Verna, and her father Gregory were
all California residents. 6 It is no wonder that the court of appeals was reluctant to
apply Indiana law. Everyone in the suit was related by either blood or marriage, and
California law governed the family relationship most central to the suit-that of
Vema and Gregory Gollnick and their daughter Karen.'0 7
To avoid Indiana law, the court glossed over the significance of the place of the tort
when considering the first step of the Hubbardrule, emphasizing instead the number
of California ties and policy reasons for applying the law of the parties' common
domicile. sAs a result, the court of appeals was able to apply California law to a suit
that would have been decided by Indiana law if the Hubbardrule were properly
applied.
Judge Sullivan's dissent in Gollnick describes the proper application of the
Hubbardrule by comparing the facts of Hubbardto the facts of Gollnick.'" He
explained:
In [Hubbardv.]Greeson, the place of the tort was virtually irrelevant to the
lawsuit. The lawsuit there involved an act of negligence or acts giving rise to
products liability which took place solely in another state and the parties all had
contacts solely with that other state. The only contact with the "place of the tort"
was the injury itself.
In the case before us, all relevant incidents and acts took place in Indiana,
including the injury. The only significant contact with California is that the
parties reside there. The place of the tort is not only significant but is the
dominant factor with respect to this litigation. The second step of the Greeson
test, therefore, is not applicable in this case."0

Judge Sullivan's strong dissent in Gollnickmakes the supreme court's adoption of
the majority opinion as "in accordance with the choice-of-law rule announced in
Hubbard""' problematic. The only way that Judge Sullivan's approach to the
members crossed state lines during temporary absences from home." (citations omitted)).
103. See id.
104. Gollnick v. Gollnick ex rel. Gollnick, 514 N.E.2d 645, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), on
reh 'g,517 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind.Ct. App. 1988), aff'd and adoptedpercuriam by 539 N.E.2d 3
(Ind. 1989).
105. Id.
106. Gollnick, 517N.E.2d at 1258.
107. See id. at 1259 (citing SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 169(2)).
108. See id.
at 1258-59.
109. See id. at 1259-60 (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting).
110. Id. at 1260.
111. Gollnick v. Gollnick, 539 N.E.2d 3, 4 (Ind. 1989).
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rule could survive the supreme court's adoption of Gollnickas it generally
Hubbard
haS" 2 is if Gollnickis considered an exception to the rule and not an example of its
application. Moreover, the supreme court cannot honestly treat Gollnick as a proper
application of the Hubbardrule without effectively overruling Hubbardaltogether.
If Gollnickwere "the rule" and not the exception, the two steps of Hubbardmust
collapse into a shotgun balancing approach. First, every legal issue in a suit would
have to be considered independently with respect to the competing interests of
individual states. Then, the collective weight of all the interested states would be
balanced against the significance ofthe relationship between the place of the tort and
the legal action. Given that the number of discrete legal issues in a suit is likely to be
limited only by the imaginations of the attorneys involved, there will seldom be a
case under this approach where lex loci delicti will prevail."' While this result may
be commendable in its own right, it is so drastically different from the choice-of-law
analysis in Hubbardthat the supreme court could not have meant to institute it as a
4
universal rule, especially in a per curiam opinion."
As an exception, Gollnick should apply only to cases with issues intricately related
to the maintenance of the family unit. In Gollnick,the issue of intrafamily immunity
was before the court of appeals and ultimately the supreme court. Intrafamilyimmunity doctrine governs whether a family member can be held liable to another
family member in tort."5 Specifically, the doctrine forbids tort actions between
spouses and between parents and their children." 6 Although these two immunities
are attributed to different sources,"' their continued existence in American law is

112. See Judge v. Pilot Oil Corp., 205 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the place of
the tort was significant and so there was no need to consider additional factors under the
second step of the Hubbardrule); Cox ex rel. Zick v. Nichols, 690 N.E.2d 750, 752 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that "tort analysis presumes that the location of the injury is the proper
choice-of-law forum unless the place of the injury is insignificant," roughly nine years after the
supreme court's adoption of Gollnick); In re Estate of Bruck, 632 N.E.2d 745, 747 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that "lex loci delicti is the rule presumptively to be applied unless the
place of the tort is an insignificant contact," roughly five years after the supreme court's
adoption of Gollnick);Tompkins v. Isbell, 543 N.E.2d 680,682 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (applying
lex loci delecti where place of the tort was significant, roughly four months after the supreme
court's adoption of Golinick); see also supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
113. The supreme court's presumption that lex loci delicti will apply except where the place
of the tort bears little connection to the legal action makes it clear that in some cases the law
of the place where the injury occurred will govern all substantive issues. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v.
Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ind. 1987). On the breadth of lex loci delicti when it applies,
see Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 487 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), vacated by 515
N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987); Gollnick v. Gollnickexrel. Gollnick, 514 N.E.2d 645, 645 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987), on reh 'g,517 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), affd and adoptedpercuriam
by 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989) (court of appeals's original decision prior to Hubbard).
114. Gollnick, 539 N.E.2d at 3. The supreme court's opinion isjust one paragraph long-a
total of 146 words.
115. See generallyW. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 122, at 901-07 (5th ed. 1984 &Supp. 1998); W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Conflict ofLaws as
to Right of.Action Between Husbandand Wife orParentand Child, 96 A.L.R.2d 973 (1964).
116. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 115, § 122, at 901-07.
117. Id.
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justified by the same reasons.' The main argument advanced in support of
intrafamily immunity is "maintenance of domestic peace and tranquility of the
family."" 19
Within this context, Gollnick's exception to the Hubbardrule is logical. In order
to preserve stability in the family relationship, choice-of-law doctrine ought to ensure
that a single body of law is consistently applied to an individual family. Of course,
the state of a family's common domicile is the best choice because it has a
predominant interest in the family relationships of its residents and will most often
be the site of the family's disputes. Stretching the Gollnick exception to apply in
situations that are not patently a matter of family law is notjustified because it denies
the rationale for the exception.
Without doubt, legislatures have enacted and will continue to enact statutes that
impact families qua families, yet defy categorization as family-law statutes. Once the
inevitable choice-of-law disputes arise involving these statutes, courts will be forced
to determine whether the statute's applicability will be controlled by the Hubbard
rule or the Gollnick exception. Guest statutes are excellent examples of the kind of
dual character statute that will place courts in this very position. Such statutes limit
motor vehicle operators' liability to certain guest passengers, often only those who
have a family relationship with the operator. 2 ' It is this familial dimension of some
guest statutes that raises the question of whether they are subject to the ordinary
operation of the Hubbardruleor are within the Gollnick exception in a choice-of-law
dispute. In order to flesh out the limits of the Gollnick exception and provide an
example of the taskbeforejudges who must determine the fate ofsuch dual-character
statutes, the following Part of this Note will examine where guest statutes fit within
Indiana choice-of-law doctrine.

IV. THE GUEST STATUTE
Guest statutes limit or in some cases eliminate the liability of a host driver to a
guest passenger.' Consequently, a defendant who is able to invoke the protection
of a guest statute has a considerable advantage in any suit; in many instances, the
plaintiff will no longer be able to maintain a cause of action. Some guest statutes
apply to all host-guest relationships alike, while others apply only when the host and
guest share a unique relationship. 22 Regardless of any given statutory language, the
application of a guest statute begins to resemble an intrafamily-immunity issue like
that in Gollnick whenever the host and guest are family members.

118. Id.at 905 ("[Regarding parental immunity] as inthe case ofhusband and wife, the chief
reason offered is that domestic tranquility and parental discipline and control would be
disturbed by the action and again on the theory that an uncompensated tort makes for peace in
the family and respect for the parent .. ").
119. Gollnick v. Gollnick ex rel. Gollnick, 514 N.E.2d 645, 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)

(describing the purpose of the Indiana doctrine of parental immunity), on reh 'g,517 N.E.2d
1257 (Ind.Ct. App. 1988), aff'd andadoptedper curiam by 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989); see also
KEETON ET AL., supra note 115, § 122, at 905.
120. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 115, § 34, at 215.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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When the applicability of a guest statute is disputed before an Indiana court, it is
likely that the Indiana guest statute"2 will be a factor. Given that likelihood, the
determination of where guest statutes generally fit within Indiana choice-of-law
doctrine should be informed by the Indiana statute. Further, the Indiana guest statute
is an excellent foundation for the choice-of-law analysis because ithighlights familylaw issues especially pertinent in light of Gollnick that would not be as obvious
under a generic statute.
Under Indiana's guest statute, the "owner, operator, or person responsible for the
operation of a motor vehicle" is liable to a parent, spouse, child or stepchild, brother,
sister, or hitchhiker solely for acts of"wanton or willful misconduct" while operating
the motor vehicle. 4 While the statute's limitation of liability to hitchhikers may be
explained by the fact that hitchhiking is illegal in Indiana,'" the policy underlying
the treatment of family members is more difficult to pin down. Over the course ofthe
guest statute's evolution, the supreme court has suggested that the following
purposes were behind its enactment:'" (1) to insulate "generous drivers from
lawsuits instituted by ungrateful guests,"' 7 (2) to prevent fraudulent or collusive
suits," (3) to protect insurance companies from juries' sympathies toward injured
plaintiffs," 9 and (4) "to foster a cooperative atmosphere among family members
regarding the use of family members' automobiles."' 30 Whether a court should treat
guest statutes with the same deference afforded intrafamily immunity in Gollnick is
a function of how they weigh these competing policies behind the guest statute.
The easiest argument to dismiss is that it is unjust to allow "ungrateful guests" to
bring lawsuits against "generous drivers."'' With the universal requirement of
automobile insurance, drivers will seldom be held financially responsible for the
damages they cause and so are not likely to consider it a personal insult to be sued
fornegligent behavior.' Further, it is foolish to suggest that a driver shouldbe able

123. IND. CODE § 34-30-11-1 (1998).

124. Id.
125. Davidson v. Davidson, 558 N.E.2d 849, 851 n.2 (Ind.Ct. App. 1990) ("The statute as
it relates to hitchhikers is perhaps better justified by noting that hitchhiking, or standing in a
roadway in an effort to solicit a ride from passing vehicles, is illegal in the State of Indiana.
126. The Indiana guest statute was first challenged on state constitutional grounds in Sidle
v.Majors,341 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 1976). The version of the statute before the supreme court in
that case, IND. CODE § 9-3-3-1 (1971) (amended 1984) (repealed 1991), did not distinguish
between passengers but limited liability solely on the basis of the host-guest relationship. In
1984, the legislature amended the guest statute to apply only to inunediate family members and
hitchhikers. See Davidson, 558 N.E.2d at 850.
127. Sidle, 341 N.E.2d at 768.
128. Id.; Davidson, 558 N.E.2d at 851.
129. Sidle, 341 N.E.2d at 771.
130. Davidson, 558 N.E.2d at 851-52.
131. Sidle, 341 N.E.2d at 768.
132. See Albert A.Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict ofLaws Towards a Theory
of EnterpriseLiability under "Foreseeableand InsurableLaws". I, 69 YALE L.J. 595, 599
(1960). But see Davidson, 558 N.E.2d at 851 (arguing that drivers still suffer through the
possible cancellation of insurance or an increase in their premiums).
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to relax his standard of care when in the company of an invited guest.'33
The policy of promoting a "cooperative atmosphere"' 13 4 within the family is of
dubious merit and should be considered only an incidental benefit of the statute. First
of all, it is questionable whether allowing a family member's injuries to go
uncompensated because they are attributable to the negligence of another family
member really fosters a healthy family relationship at all.'35 Secondly, the supreme
court upheld the Indiana guest statue against a state equal protection challenge in
ground that it is aimed primarily at the prevention of
Davidsonv. Davidson 36 on the
137
fraudulent or collusive suits.
Of the policies behind the guest statute, the prevention of fraudulent and collusive
suits should be given the most emphasis. In Davidson, the guest statute at issue
3
applied exclusivelyto immediate family and hitchhikers as does the current statute. 1
The plaintiff argued that the statute should not apply to her because as a "noncustodial stepchild" she would not be within the scope of the Indiana doctrine of
parent-child immunity. 39 By analogy, she further argued that she was outside the
scope of the guest statute because its family-oriented language indicated that
promoting "family harmony" was its main purpose. 14 In response to plaintiffs
argument, the supreme court offered an alternate explanation for the amended guest
statute's focus on the family, suggesting that "[t]he legislature may have perceived
a greater risk of collusive lawsuits among family members, than among mere
acquaintances."'' With that rationale in mind, the guest statute could withstand the
plaintiffs equal protection challenge based solely on the purpose of preventing
fraudulent and collusive suits. The supreme court held, "The legislature's concern
about increased opportunities to engage in collusion and insurance fraud due to the
familial relationship constitutes the substantial state interest to be protected under the
statute.' ' 42 It is important to note that the supreme court treated the legislative
purpose behind the guest statute as distinct from that underlying the doctrine of
parent-child immunity. According to the court, the legislature was mainly concerned
about fraud when it passed the guest statute, while the judiciary sought to maintain
"domestic peace and tranquility" by promulgating the doctrine of parent-child

133. See Ehrenzweig, supranote 132, at 599.
134. Davidson, 558 N.E.2d at 851-52.
135. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 115, § 122, at 905 (discussing the purported benefits
of intrafamily immunity).
136. 558 N.E.2d 849 (Ind.Ct. App. 1990).
137. Id. at 850.
138. Id. at 850.
139. Id. at 852.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 851-53.
142. Id. at 852. The supreme court also distinguished between parent-child immunity and
the guest statute on the basis that the former is ajudicially created doctrine while the latter was
legislatively enacted. Id. For that reason, the court pointed out that it had more freedom to the
modify the doctrine of parent-child immunity than the application of a statute. Id. However,
the court's later emphasis on the substantive difference between the purposes behind parentchild immunity and the guest statute diffused the argument for treating them similarly.
Consequently, the judicial capacity distinction also became moot.
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immunity. 143
The two remaining policies in support ofthe Indiana guest statute maybe discussed
together. The prevention of fraudulent and collusive suits,'" which has already been
referred to above, encompasses for all practical purposes the protection of insurance
companies againstjuries' predisposition toward injured plaintiffs. On the one hand,
the concern is that the parties to the suit will defraud the insurance company with a
false claim. On the other hand, the concern is that the jury will defraud the insurance
company by "colluding" with the plaintiff and then, out of sympathy, it will find the
negligence requirement satisfied regardless of the strength ofplaintiff s case. Inboth
instances, the focus is on protecting the public from the cost of fraudulent suits.
The presumption that the costs to the public result from an increase in costs to
insurance companies is evident from the criticism levied against guest statutes for
being the product of powerful insurance lobbies.145 However, another valid reason
for legislatures to enact prophylactic measures against fraudulent suits is to prevent
scarce judicial resources from being squandered on cases that should have never
been filed.'" From the position of the legislature, the latter reason may even have
more weight given its immediate impact on the state budget.
A comparison ofthe purposes behind the Indiana guest statute and those underlying
intrafamily immunity reveals that the guest statute should not fall within Gollnick's
exception to the Hubbardrule. Just as the supreme court argued in Davidson, the
guest statute was originally enacted for the purpose of preventing fraud and
collusion. 147 The later amendment of the statute to focus on immediate family and
hitchhikers did not alter that purpose. Rather, the legislature narrowed the statute to
pinpoint more precisely the relationships in which the threat of fraud was especially
great.' Meanwhile, judges have preserved the doctrine of intrafamily immunity in
order to foster a peaceful environment within families. 149 The overlap of the guest
statute and the doctrine of intrafamily immunity is incidental and does not justify
treating them identically for choice-of-law purposes. In fact, treating the guest statute
as an issue of family law would actually subvert the intent of the legislature in some
instances.
The following hypothetical demonstrates the error of including the guest statute
within the Gollnick exception: Husband and Wife take a road trip from their home

143. Id. (citing Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441 N.E.2d 711, 714 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)).
144. Sidle v. Majors, 341 N.E.2d 763, 768 (Ind. 1976); Davidson, 558 N.E.2d at 851.
145. See KEETONETAL, supranote 115, § 34, at215 n.75 (citing Chas. Chaflin Allen, Why
Do Courts Coddle InsuranceCompanies?, 61 AM. L. REv. 77 (1927)); J. Walter White, The
Liability ofan Automobile Driverto a Non-payingPassenger,20 VA. L. REV. 326 (1934); see
also Ehrenzweig, supra note 132, at 603.
146. See Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky. 1967). On the application of the
Indiana guest statute, the Kentucky court of appeals said, "While it might be said that Indiana
has apolicy ofprotecting drivers on their highways from claims by passengers, surely this must
extend no further than an interest in protecting Indiana residents or those who sue in Indiana
courts." Id.
147. Davidson, 558 N.E.2d at 851.
148. See id.
149. See KEETON ETAL, supranote 115, § 122, at 901-06; see also Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441
N.E.2d711 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (abrogating partially the Indiana parental-immunity doctrine).
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state (no guest statute) to Indiana (guest statute) where they have an accident. In
order to take advantage of Wife's hefty insurance policy, they agree that Husband
will sue Wife for negligently causing the accident and his subsequent injuries. While
Husband "convalesces" due to "extensive" and virtually unimpeachable neck and
back injuries in a local Indiana hospital, his attorney files suit in an Indiana court.
Wife's insurance company pleads the Indiana guest statute and motions for summary
judgment, alleging that Husband's complaint fails to show "wanton or willful
misconduct." 1" Husband responds by citing Gollnick'5' and claiming that the
application of the guest statute is an issue of intrafamily inmunity to be governed by
the law of the parties' common domicile and that the Indiana guest statute does not
apply.
If the court rules for the Husband and includes the guest statute within the Gollnick
exception, it does a regrettable disservice to the Indiana legislature." Husband and
Wife will have successfully brought a fraudulent suit in an Indiana court, using up
precious judicial resources, in direct conflict with the purposes behind the Indiana
guest statute. This result is especially disenchanting after taking into account that
Indiana residents will always be subject to the guest statute. In the end, Indiana
courts will sponsor the intrafamily negligence suits of out-of-state litigants while
denying virtually identical causes of action to Indiana residents. The legislature could
not have intended this result.
A close reading of Gollnick reveals that neither the court of appeals nor the
supreme court intended to endorse a particular choice-of-law approach regarding
guest statutes.' 53 The court of appeals's Gollnick opinion cited to only a few cases
where a guest statute was at issue. In each of those cases, the guest statute was
treated uniquely." This ambiguity in Gollnick supports the proposition that guest
statutes should not be treated the same as intrafamily immunity. Guest statutes are
problematic enough without subjecting them to a choice-of-law exception that was
adopted for another purpose. If guest statutes do warrant special treatment, the

150. IND. CODE § 34-30-11-1 (1998).
151. Gollnick v. Gollnick, 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989).
152. The Ohio Supreme Court clearly expressed the duty of its state courts in Schiltz v.
Meyer, 280 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1972). The supreme court held that the substantive law of Ohio,
including its guest statute, would apply to an Ohio suit arising out of an Ohio accident between
a Kentucky plaintiff and defendants from Kentucky and Ohio. Id. at 927. The supreme court
explained:
In this case, the plaintiffs have chosen Ohio rather than their state of residency
as the forum state. In so doing, they have increased our governmental interest
beyond that of merely being the state in which the accident occurred. We now
have the additional interest of advancing, in our courts, those policies which our
General Assembly has seen fit to maintain in this area oftort law. Until such time
as the General Assembly amends or repeals our guest statute, we are bound to
apply it in cases before our courts wherein the accident occurred in Ohio.
Id. at 927; see also Conklin v. Homer, 157 N.W.2d 579 (Wis. 1968) (refusing to apply the
Illinois guest statute to a suit involving an accident in Wisconsin between Illinois residents).
153. See Gollnick v. Gollnick ex rel. Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d 1257, 1257-59 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988), aff'd and adoptedpercuriam by 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989).
154. Id. at 1258-59 (citing Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955), and Wessling v.
Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967)).
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supreme court should create an exception that is crafted to the peculiarities of the
guest statutes and preserves the legislative intent behind their enactment.
In Gollnick,5 5 the court of appeals cites Emery v. Emery,'" a case in which the
California Supreme Court applied the law of the parties' domicile (California) to
determine the issue ofparental immunity." It is particularly significant that inEmery
the court also applied the guest statute of the place of the tort (Idaho) to determine
the applicable standard of liability. 8 The Idaho guest statute, like the Indiana guest
statute, did not bar an action by a guest against a host but limited liability to
situations in which the guest proves a certain standard of gross misconduct 59
According to the supreme court in Emery, the guest statute was a duty-of-care issue
in tort while parental immunity was an issue of family law."
The distinction between a "capacity to sue"'' and a standard of liability is also
significant. In Gollnick, parental immunity would ultimately decide whether the
plaintiff could maintain a cause of action against her father. The court of appeals in
Gollnick relied on several cases that addressed the question of capacity to sue and
not the standard of liability. 62 Where a true capacity-to-sue question is involved, the
courts are more inclined to apply the law of the parties' domicile.6 3 It is reasonable
to infer from this fact that courts understand that a statute altering the standard of
liability probably has more nuanced underlying purposes than does the basic
immunity doctrine.'

155. Id. at 1258.
156. 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955).
157. See id. at 223.
158. See id. at 221.
159. See id. The Idaho guest statute provided:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest
without payment for such transportation shall have a cause for damages against
such owner or operator for injuries, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such
accident shall have been intentional on the part of the said owner or operator or
caused by his intoxication or his reckless disregard of the rights of others.
Id. (citing IDAHO CODE § 49-1001 (1948) (current version at IDAHO CODE § 49-2415 (2000))).
160. See id. at 221-22
161. See, e.g., id. at 222.
162. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699, 699 (Alaska 1968) (noting Canadian
statute bars tort action between spouses while living together); Wartell v. Formusa, 213 N.E.2d
544, 545 (Ill. 1966) (noting Florida law bars interspousal action in tort during coverture);
Aurora Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 268 N.E.2d 552, 553 (I11.
App. Ct. 1971) (assuming for the
purposes of its opinion that Iowa law grants complete parental immunity).
163. See Emery, 289 P.2d at 222-23.
164. The Second Restatement is also clearer on the question of interspousal immunity than
on the proper choice of law regarding interspousal standards of liability:
In general, it is fitting that the state whose interests are most deeply affected
should have its local law applied. Which is the state of dominant interest may
depend upon the issue involved. So if a husband injures his wife in a state other
than that of their domicil, it may be that the state of conduct and injury has the
dominant interest in determiningwhetherthe husband'sconduct was tortiousor
whether the wife was guilty of contributorynegligence. On the other hand, the
state of the spouses' domicil is the state of dominant interest when it comes to the

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 76:4

The court of appeals also cites Wessling v. Paris165 in Gollnick 166 In Wessling, two
Kentucky residents in a host-guest relationship had an accident in Indiana."6 The
Kentucky Court ofAppeals 61 noted the substantialKentucky contacts in the case and
asserted that the occurrence of the accident in Indiana was "fortuitous."' 69 The court
said that Indiana did not have any interest in the case before it, but added, "While it
might be said that Indiana has a policy of protecting drivers on their highways from
claims by passengers, surely this must extend no further than an interest in protecting
Indiana residents or those who sue in Indiana courts."'7 0 Not surprisingly, a pattern
emerges among cases where courts find that the state in which the accident occurred
has no interest in the application of its guest statute. 71' Especially when the suit is not
brought in the state with the guest statute where the "fortuitous" accident occurred.
Often the forum state is the domicile of one or more parties to the suit as well, and
consequently, the concerns leading to the enactment of the guest statute-insurance
fraud within the state and wasting of the state's legal resources-are no longer an
issue.
Outside the Gollnick exception, the applicability of a guest statute will be subject
to the ordinary application of the Hubbard rule. In most automobile accident
cases-the only cases where the guest statute comes into play-the place of the tort
will be the same as the place where the alleged negligent conduct occurred. 72
Because whether the defendant's conduct is negligent willbe determined by the rules
of the road of that same place, the significance factor of the first step of the Hubbard

question whether the husbandshould be held immune from tort liability to his
wife.
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 6 cmt. f (emphasis added). This ambiguity is most
likely rooted in the difference between the policies responsible for the immunity doctrine and
those behind laws like the guest statute that alter the standard of liability.
165. 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
166. Gollnick v. Golinick ex rel. Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988),
aff'd and adoptedper curiam by 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989).
167. Wessling, 417 S.W.2d at 259.
168. Before 1976, the Kentucky Court of Appeals was the highest court in Kentucky. In
1976, the term "Kentucky Supreme Court" replaced "Kentucky Court of Appeals" as the name
of the highest court. See K.Y. CoNsT. of 1891, § 109, as amendedby 1974 Ky. Acts. Ch. 84,
§§ 1-3 (effective Jan. 1, 1976).
169. Wessling, 417 S.W.2d at 261.
170. Id. at 260.
171. See id. at 261 (declining to apply the Indiana guest statute to a Kentucky suit involving
an accident in Indiana between Kentucky residents); Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 398
(N.Y. 1969) (declining to apply the Michigan guest statute to a New York suit involving an
accident in Michigan betweenNewYorkresidents); Babcockv. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 28485 (N.Y. 1963) (declining to apply the Ontario guest statute in a New York suit involving an
accident in Ontario between New York residents). But see Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d
454,456 (N.Y. 1972) (applying the Ontario guest statute in aNew York suit involving accident
in Ontario between an Ontario plaintiff and a New York defendant to the advantage of the New
York defendant).
172. The only exception that this author can fathom is where a driver negligently causes his
vehicle to spin out of control and then slides across the state line before his passenger suffers
any injuries.
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rule will be satisfied and lex loci delicti should apply.
The de facto result of the Hubbardrule is that the doctrine of lex loci delicti will
determine the applicability of a guest statute in practically every case. The
advantages of applying lex loci delicti are its "predictability, uniformity, and
discouragement of forum shopping."'' While the faults of lex loci delicti in this
context are well documented,174 it remains the only doctrinally sound approach to the
guest statute under the Hubbardrle-at least until the supreme court chooses to
address the unique history of the guest statute through an appropriate exception.
CONCLUSION

When the Indiana Supreme Court departed from the strict application of lex loci
75
delicti in Hubbard,'
the Second Restatement 176 was already sixteen years old. In

crafting the Hubbardrule, however, the Indiana Supreme Court appeared just as
wary of the Second Restatement as it was disappointed with lex loci delicti."
Certainly, the supreme court's doubts about the Second Restatement were justified.
Upon its publication, academics greeted the Second Restatement with a flurry of
criticism, some of it rather brutal. 7 They argued that the Second Restatement was
"too much of a compromise among conflicting philosophies, too vague, exceedingly
elastic, unpredictable, directionless, and rudderless." 79 Byretaining the presumptive
application of lex loci delicti when the place of the tort is significant, the Indiana
Supreme Court avoided some of the concerns about vagueness and unpredictability
that so animated the critics of the Second Restatement.
In contrast to the Indiana supreme court, other state judiciaries have been quicker
to adopt the Second Restatement.10 As of the latest survey, twenty-one jurisdictions
within the United States follow the SecondRestatement in tort conflicts.'' Now that
the Second Restatement has become a powerful force nationally in choice-of-law
doctrine, academics have begun to question whether it is time to begin drafting anew
restatement of conflicts."s Many of the problems anticipated by early critics have
been realized in practice, as courts applying the Second Restatement find little

173. See Yonover, supra note 4, at 1207.
174. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 132, at 599-600; Charles D. Kelso, Automobile
AccidentsandIndianaConflictofLaws: CurrentDilemmas,33 IND. L.J. 297 (1958); Yonover,
supra note 4, at 1208 n.58 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 316 nn.21-22

(1981)).
175. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987).
176. SEcOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 6 cmt. f
177. Hubbard,515 N.E.2d at 1073-74.
178. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts
Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REv. 1248, 1249 & n.3 (1997).
179. Id. at 1250.
180. See generally Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement
(anda Proposalfor Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437, 439 (2000).
181. See id. at 439 & n. 12 (citing Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice ofLaw in the American
Courtsin 1998: Twelfth Annual Survey, 47 AM. J. CON,. L. 327,329 (1999)).
182. See Symposium, Preparingfor the Next Century-aNew Restatement ofConflicts?,
75 IND. L.J. 399 (2000).
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guidance in the accumulation of confusing and even contradictory precedents.8 3 The
conflict between Hubbard1" and Gollnick85 certainly deserves to be placed in the
latter category-even though, ironically, the Indiana Supreme Court sought to stop
short of adopting the Second Restatement. The resurgence of interest in more
standard, workable rules should cue the Indiana Supreme Court to clear up the
confusion surrounding the Hubbardruleso that Indiana choice-of-law doctrine does
not drift further into the abyss of the Second Restatement.
The Hubbard rule may not be perfect, but it can be a workable compromise
between lex loci delicti and the Second Restatement. The last thirty years under the
auspices of the SecondRestatementhave shown that the Indiana Supreme Court had
good reason to craft the Hubbardrule in the manner that it did. All that is left for the
supreme court to do is to step in and clarify its earlier position so that the Hubbard
rule has a chance to prove its merits. To that end, the Indiana Supreme Court is well
advised to take note of the criticism lodged against the Second Restatement,
especially when it fleshes out the second step of the Hubbardrule.

183. See Symeonides, supra note 180, at 447 & n.60.
184. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987).
185. Gollniek v. Gollnick, 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989).

